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Abstract
This thesis studies a dual-level decentralized supply chain consisting of two suppliers
and two retailers facing a price- and lead-time-sensitive demand. We model the
suppliers’ operations as M/M/1 queues and demand as a linear function of the retail
prices and promised delivery lead-times offered to the customers. Three different
kinds of games are constructed to analyze the pricing and lead-time decisions of the
suppliers and retailers. We show the existence of a unique equilibrium in all games
and provide the exact formulas to compute the optimal decisions for both the
suppliers and retailers. We further present numerical examples to illustrate how the
results of our model can be used to provide useful managerial insights for selecting
the best strategies for suppliers and retailers under different market and operational
environments.
Key Words: Pricing; Lead-time; Duopoly common retailer channel; Stackelberg
game; Vertical Nash game
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent time, the quality of many consumer products, such as washing machines
and televisions, has become fairly similar across brands. Many companies thus
compete increasingly on price and lead-time. An e-retailer, for example, can offer
products from different brands on his website. A customer who wants to buy a
television can visit the websites of e-retailers, such as www.51mjd.com and
www.qhea.com, to compare the products, prices, and promised delivery lead-times of
different brands. In some cases, a customer can even liaise with an e-retailer to
customize a product according to his preference, such as adding his name or a logo
on a jersey produced by a specific supplier. Once the order is placed, the e-retailer
can then relay the order to the specific supplier to customize, assemble and deliver
the product directly to the customer.
The above scenario is relatively common in many e-retailing platforms where a
group of competing retailers serves as intermediaries or brand-agents for a group of
competing suppliers. Each supplier offers its product to potential retailers at a fixed
wholesale price with a promise to produce and deliver the orders to the end
customers within a Promised Delivery Lead-Time (PDL). Each retailer then, in turn,
adds on its own desired margin and offers the product to its customers at a fixed retail
price and the PDL promised by the supplier. In most cases, we observe that each
seller (both supplier and retailer) generally favors offering to all its clients a fixed
price and PDL which may differ amongst different sellers.
2In an environment where suppliers and retailers compete for consumers to
maximize their own profits, setting the right price and PDL is a challenge. For
example, a supplier who offers its product at a higher wholesale price and longer
PDL might lose its customers to other suppliers. In contrast, a supplier who sets a
lower wholesale price and shorter PDL might increase its sales, but face a greater
load on its capacity and ability to meet its PDL. With many orders and limited
capacity, the actual Realized Delivery Lead-Time (RDL) of a supplier might differ
from its PDL. If RDL is larger than PDL, loss of goodwill and penalty for late
delivery might occur. If RDL is smaller than PDL, storage cost for early order
completions might occur. As suppliers are responsible for the delivery of their own
products, each supplier is likely the sole party responsible for the cost of its early and
late deliveries. To maximize its revenue and minimize its penalty for late delivery, a
supplier must offer a short and competitive PDL with sufficient capacity to achieve a
reliable RDL. Similarly, a retailer who offers a lower retail price may enjoy higher
sales than a retailer who offers a higher retail price. The revenue of each supplier and
retailer is thus a function of the retail prices and PDLs offered by different suppliers
and retailers. The goal of each seller is to set a price and PDL that maximize its own
profits.
This thesis studies the pricing and lead-time decisions of a dual-level
decentralized supply chain (DSC) consisting of two suppliers and two retailers in a
price- and lead-time-sensitive market. The retailers serve as brand-agents and collate
orders for two competing products, each produced by a different supplier. Each
supplier produces its own product and delivers the orders directly to the customers.
3The two retailers sell the products of both suppliers such that competitions are
involved in both horizontal and vertical levels.
This thesis is the first study to examine the pricing and lead-time decisions in
the presence of vertical and horizontal interactions in a dual-level supply chain. Most
of the past papers on the duopoly common retailer structure focus on price and/or
quantity decisions. In this study, we introduce the PDL as another decision for the
suppliers. As a result, the suppliers suffer a lead-time cost resulting from the different
between PDL and RDL (which is first introduced by Liu et al. 2007). We find
suppliers can gain significant advantages from their decisions on PDL, especially
when their capacities are high. The performance of the retailers is significantly
affected by the capacities of the suppliers, too.
When there is more than one level, members between different levels and
members in the same level can play game with each other. Channel leadership, which
describes whether suppliers or retailers have the channel power to exploit the others’
reaction functions, will influence the results of equilibrium. Retailers normally have
conflicting goals from those of the suppliers. Thus far, most channel studies have
traditionally approached the problem from the supplier’s perspective.
Presently, many retailers have caught up with the suppliers, some are even more
powerful than the suppliers, and are gaining more influence on how products are
distributed and at what price. There have been only a limited number of research
papers that focus on channels with these powerful retailers. In order to fully analyze
the effects of different channel leadership, we provide an analysis of this duopoly
common retailer structure under three different decision scenarios. One is
4considering more powerful suppliers under which the suppliers act as the leaders and
the retailers as the followers (which is often referred to as Suppliers Stakelberg
game), the second one is considering more powerful retailers under which the
retailers act as the leaders and the suppliers as the followers ( which is called
Retailers Stakelberg game), and at last we consider retailers and suppliers with
similar power make decisions at the same time (which is so-called Vertical Nash
game). We will examine the effect of different market and operational environments
on the performance of the system under these different game rules.
This thesis is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a review of the
literature on price and lead-time competition and on different channel structure. In
Section 3, we introduce our model and assumptions. In section 4, we establish the
Suppliers Stackelberg game, describe best reactions for retailers and get the
equilibrium solution for suppliers. The Retailers Stackelberg game and theVertical
Nash game are examined in sections 5 and 6 respectively. In section 7, we present
numerical comparisons of supply chain’s performance under different games and
conduct several sensitivity analysis of the main marketing and operational parameters.
Finally, we conclude in section 8 with future research directions.
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Literature Review
The importance of products’ PDL has been widely recognized since 1980s. From
then on, many papers have studied on price and PDL decisions together. Three main
streams of literature are relevant to our study: the first stream consider a monopolist
firm, which means there is only one decision maker. Palaka et al. (1998) study a firm,
where customer demand is treated as linear in the quoted price and lead-time. Firm
operations are modeled as an M/M/1 queue with first-come first-serve sequencing.
The objective is to maximize revenues minus the total variable production costs,
congestion-related costs and lateness penalty costs subject to a service-level
constraint, which specifies the minimum probability of meeting the quoted lead-time.
So and Song (1998) use the log-linear Cobb-Douglas demand function to model the
demand in a similar setting, but do not include congestion or lateness penalty costs in
the objective function. They developed a model to study the optimal selection of
price, uniform delivery time and capacity expansion to maximize the overall profit,
where demands were assumed to be sensitive to both the price and delivery time.
Boyaci and Ray (2003) extend the previous two models to the case of two
substitutable products within one firm for which dedicated capacities are allocated.
They examine price, lead-time, and capacity decisions of two substitutable products
for a firm with price- and time-sensitive demands. They develop insights into the
relationship between the relative cost of capacity for the two products and the price
or time differentiation that the firm offers to the market. Ray and Jewkes (2004)
extend previous research by explicitly modeling a relationship between price and
6delivery time. The firm they investigate can invest in increasing capacity to guarantee
a shorter delivery time but must be able to satisfy the guarantee according to a pre-
specified reliability level. The model accounts for whether customers are "price
sensitive" or "lead-time sensitive" by capturing the dependence of both price and
demand on delivery time.
The second stream mainly focuses on competition among firms without
consideration of upstream or downstream. So (2000) extends the work of So and
Song (1998) to a competitive setting of N M/M/1 firms using a multiplicative
competitive interaction model, where the market size is constant and shared among
firms based on their "attraction" given their quoted prices and lead-times. Cachon
and Harker (2002) present the option of outsourcing to a supplier for two competing
firms. Two types of competition are analyzed: an M/M/1 queueing game with price
and time sensitive demand and an EOQ game with fixed ordering costs and price
sensitive demand. In their paper, they aggregate price and waiting time into a “full
price”. For the queueing game, each firm’s demand rate is modeled as a function of
the full prices of both firms with two forms: linear and truncated logit. Allon and
Federgruen (2007, 2009) model N M/M/1 firms, the former for a single customer
class and the latter for N customer classes. In Allon and Federgruen (2007), the
authors use service level, which is defined as the difference between an upper bound
benchmark for waiting time and the firm’s actual waiting time standard, and
expressed in terms of the expected waiting time or the critical fractile of the waiting
time distribution. A cost per unit time proportional to adopted capacity is included in
the profit function. Three types of competition are studied: Two-stage games, where
7service level is set in the first stage while price is set in the second stage and vice
versa, and simultaneous price and service competition. In Allon and Federgruen
(2009), waiting time is explicitly incorporated into the demand model. A class
dependent cost and a cost per unit time proportional to capacity are included in the
profit function. Price only competition, waiting time only competition, and
simultaneous competition are studied using dedicated or shared facilities for
customer classes.
The third stream involves about two-level decision makers. Those papers
consider a two-level supply chain and analyze the effects of intra-supply chain
competition on the selection of optimal price and lead-time. Boyaci and Gallego
(2004) consider two supply chains, each one consists of a supplier and a retailer, and
compete on the basis of customer service. They use a queueing model with generic
lead-time distribution. Three scenarios are analyzed: 1) Both supply chains are
uncoordinated, i.e., each party selects their own decisions , 2) a hybrid scenario
where only one supply chain is coordinated, and 3) both supply chains are
coordinated. Bernstein and Federgruen (2007) study a multi-period setting , where
there exist a common supplier and competing independent retailers. Customer
demand depends on all of the firms’ prices and a measure of service level. In these
papers, the lead-time decision is formulated in the way of the service level, and they
are taken as stable without considering the tardiness cost for late delivery. Liu et al.
(2007) study a decentralized supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer
facing price- and lead-time-sensitive demands. They examine the interaction between
the suppliers' RDL and PDL closely, and demonstrate its strong impact on the
8decisions and on the performance in a DSC. However, this paper only consider the
competition within the supply chain. We establish a more complex supply chain and
take the inter-supply chain competition into account.
From the channel structure aspect, the issue of "power" in the supply chain
channels for consumer products has received considerable attention in both academic
and practitioner journals (e.g., Messinger and Narasimhan 1995, Johnson 1988,
Business Week 1992). While most of previous models about channel structures are
about single supplier and single retailer; McGuire and Staelin (1983) consider a
single supplier being paired with a single retailer, but there are two (or more) such
exclusive pairs. Gupta and Loulou (1998) extend the former work and find the
optimal channel structure decision depends on interactions between two parameters:
the degree of substitutability between products and the level of investements required
to achieve production cost reduction; Ingene and Parry (1995) studies a two-part
tariff problem using a multiple retailer model with a single supplier. It was shown
that the (near-) optimal tariff from this multiple retailer model can be more profitable
than the channel coordinating solution from dyadic models. A model with multiple
suppliers and a single retailer has also been analyzed: Choi (1991) focuses on the
effects of retailer power that stems from dealing multiple products. Vrinda et al.
(2000) study under a similar situation, but they extend the game-theoretic literature
by allowing for a continuum of possible channel interactions between suppliers and a
retailer, they examine how channel power is related to demand conditions facing
various brands and cost parameters of various suppliers. Choi (1996) merges these
latter two structures to study multiple suppliers and retailers channel. He manages to
9study price decision in a duopoly common retailer channel and finds some new
insights. From then on, the duopoly common retailer channel has been widely
discussed, but almost all papers only focus on price and/or quantity decisions under
this structure. In our model, we combine the pricing and PDL decisions into this
channel, and it works out that the new decision variable we introduced, the supplier's
PDL, will make the results different from the previous results obtained by
considering the pricing decisions only under identical marketing conditions (such as
Choi, 1996) .
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Chapter 3
Problem Formulation
In this paper, we consider a duopoly common retailer channel structure, as depicted
in Figure 1. Each of the two suppliers sells their partially differentiated products
through both retailers to end customers, who are sensitive to both price and lead-time.
Figure 1 Duopoly Common Retailer Channel Structure
Upon receiving an order from the retailer, the supplier completes the product
and delivers it to the customer directly. Since the product is not unique in the market
(the other supplier produces a substitutable product) and potential customers for the
product are sensitive to both price and PDL, the suppliers has to offer a competitive
wholesale price and PDL. On the other hand, as the capacity of the supplier is finite
and cannot be changed quickly, higher demands may cause longer customer RDL
and late delivery. When this occurs, we assume that customers’ additional waiting
cost and inconvenience from late delivery will be covered exactly by the supplier
with a generic penalty cost per unit per unit time late, and the possible delivery delay
and the associated compensation are known to the customer . Since two retailers sell
Supplier 2Supplier 1
Retailer 2Retailer 1
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both products, they have to determine their individual retail price carefully to attract
more customers and maximize own profit.
As independent decision makers, the suppliers and the retailers make their own
decisions aiming at maximizing their individual profit rates. The suppliers know their
production facility and how quickly they can respond to customer orders. Naturally
then, the suppliers should determine the PDL to be quoted to customers in addition to
the wholesale price. They will be fully responsible for any late delivery penalties. On
the other hand, the retailers should determine the best retail prices so that the
retailers' own profits rate are maximized. Because the retail prices together with the
PDL will affect the level of demands and thus the suppliers’ profits, the suppliers
must consider the action of the retailers when making their decisions and this is the
so-called intra supply chain effects. Meanwhile, the decisions of the other supplier
will also affect its demand and profit and this is the so-called inter supply chain
competition. We assume that the suppliers share with the retailers the RDL
information fully and are informed by the retailers of how customers will react to the
PDL and retail prices.
3.1 Notation
The notation used in our model is summarized as follows. Whenever two subscripts
are used, the first one refers to the suppliers, while the second one to the retailers.
ijλ
: demand rate for product i sold by retailer j;
i
S
λ
: total demand for product i, i.e., demand rate for supplier i,
i
S ii ij
λ λ λ= + ;
i
R
λ
: demand rate for retailer i,
i
R ii ji
λ λ λ= + ;
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0λ : market potential for a single product sold by each retailer (this is the total
demand if all decisions are zero);
α
: price sensitivity of demand;
β : lead-time sensitivity of demand;
pθ
: sensitivity of switchovers toward price difference;
lθ
: sensitivity of switchovers toward promised lead-time difference;
rθ : sensitivity of switchovers toward retailer difference;
p
i j
: price of product i sold by retailer j;
il
: promised lead-time by supplier i;
All these parameters are assumed to be nonnegative.
3.2 Demand Function
In this thesis, we choose to employ a linear demand function that:
)()()(
)()()(
)()()(
)()()(
2221212212222022
2122212111221021
1211121222112012
1112121121111011
ppllpplp
ppllpplp
ppllpplp
ppllpplp
rlp
rlp
rlp
rlp
−+−+−+−−=
−+−+−+−−=
−+−+−+−−=
−+−+−+−−=
θθθβαλλ
θθθβαλλ
θθθβαλλ
θθθβαλλ
From where we can get:
1
2
0 11 12 1 2 1 21 22 11 12
0 11 12 2 1 2 11 12 21 22
2 ( ) 2 2 ( ) ( )
2 ( ) 2 2 ( ) ( )
S l p
S l p
p p l l l p p p p
p p l l l p p p p
λ λ α β θ θ
λ λ α β θ θ
= − + − + − + + − −
= − + − + − + + − −
This kind of demand function is very common in economic literatures, such as
Choi (1996) and Boyaci and Ray (2003). We derive the demand function for two
suppliers by using a method mentioned by Singh and Vives (1984). We assume there
13
is a continuum of consumers of the same type with a utility function separable and
linear in the particular product. From the perspective of two products (or two
suppliers), the representative consumer maximizes:
1 2 1 2 1 211 1 12 2 21 3 22 4 1 2
( , ) ( ) ( )
s s s s w s w s
U p q p q p q p q c l c lλ λ λ λ λ λ− + − + − −
Where 1 11 12 2 11 12Pr( ), Pr( )q p p q p p= < = ≥ , 3 21 22 4 21 22Pr( ), Pr( )q p p q p p= < = ≥ ,
and
w
c
is the waiting cost per unit time. The utility function
1 2
( , )
s s
U λ λ
is assumed
to be quadratic and strictly concave, which can be expressed as follows:
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
2 2( , ) ( ) ( ) / 2
s s s s S s s S
U x y zλ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ= + − + +
Here , ,x y z are positive parameters. This utility function gives rise to a linear
demand structure. Direct demands are given by:
1
2
21 3 22 4 2 111 1 12 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
21 3 22 4 1 211 1 12 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
w
s
w
s
z p q p q c zl yl
y p q p qxy xz
y z y z y z y z
y p q p q c zl yl
z p q p qxy xz
y z y z y z y z
λ
λ
+ −+−
= + − +
− − − −
+ −+−
= + − +
− − − −
We can get the demand function for each supplier exactly as we mentioned
above by letting 1 2 3 4 1/ 2q q q q= = = = , 0 /( )x y zλ = + , 1/[2( )]y zα = + and
w
cβ α= .
3.3 Assumptions
We make some reasonable assumptions to simplify our model without loss of
generality.
1. Assume no competition between different products in different retailers
because this influence is quite small, we can just ignore it. If needed, we can include
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this factor into our demand function by just add a new parameter and the results will
not be affected (further explanation can be found in Appendix A).
2. Assume each retail selects the same level of margin for both products, which
denoted by m
j
; so we have p
i j
= w
i
+m
j
. We make this assumption because that due to
the assumptions of symmetric demand function and horizontal differentiations of
products and stores, we have a prior knowledge that the nontrivial equilibrium retail
margins for the two products are the same (we take one of our games as an example
to show this in the Appendix A). We make it also for analytical tractability and
reduce the dimensions of the problem. So the demand function can rewrite as follows:
(4)                 )(2)(22)2(2                  
(3)                  )(2)(22)2(2                  
(2)                              )(2)()2(2                  
(1)                             )(2)()2(2                   
212122120
121212110
21212120
12212110
2
1
2
1
llwwlmmw
llwwlmmw
mmllwwm
mmllwwm
lpS
lpS
rR
rR
−+−+−++−=
−+−+−++−=
−++−++−=
−++−++−=
θθβαλλ
θθβαλλ
θβαλλ
θβαλλ
3. Assume symmetric manufacturing costs, holding and tardiness cost for both
suppliers to simplify our analysis without distracting from main insights.
Let b be the tardiness cost per unit per unit time and h be the holding cost per
unit per unit time. Let
i
F
λ
and
i
f
λ
be the PDF and CDF of the RDL for a given
demand rate
i
λ , then the expected lead-time cost for supplier i is:
0
( , ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i
i i i
i
l
i i i
l
C l f t h l t f t dt b t l f t dt
λ λ λ
∞
= − + −∫ ∫
We can easiy show that ( , ( ))
i
i
C l f t
λ
is convex in li. Note that if early delivery
is allowed without penalty, the holding cost h can be set to zero and the above model
is still completely valid. Also, for practical systems, we should have 0≥> hb ;
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otherwise, suppliers will always set PDL to be 0.
Let c be the manufacturing cost per unit, let
i
w
be the wholesale prices given
by supplier i, we can get the supplier’s optimization problem(SOP)should be given
by:
)5(                                        )))(,((  max:                     
i
i
i
SiiS
tflCcwSOP λ
λ
−−=Π
4. Normalize the processing costs to retailers to be 0 . So the retailer’s
optimization problem (ROP) is given by:
)6(                                                              max:                                        
jj
RjR
mROP λ=Π
Under this basic model, the final decision variables are: suppliers’ wholesale
prices, suppliers’ PDL and retailers’ margins. As we have discussed, the supply chain
members play games in making decisions, then different game rules may result in
different results. We present three different kinds of games to cover all the possible
power structures in this two-level competition in next three sections, to see the effects
of different games on the players’ decisions.
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Chapter 4
The Suppliers Stackelberg Game
In this section, we consider the scenario that the four members of the supply chain
interact in a Stackelberg game with the suppliers as the leaders and the retailers as the
followers. In this Suppliers Stackelberg (SS) game, each manufacturer chooses his
wholesale price and lead-time using the retailers’ reaction functions and the
wholesale price of the competitor’s product. Given these wholesale prices, each
retailer determines its margins. We present the retailers best response to the suppliers
decisions and determine the suppliers PDL strategy. We propose one common RDL
model (the M/M/1 queuing model, which has been often used in the supply chain
literature, e.g., So, 2000) and present the corresponding equilibrium strategies of the
players under this model and other two games.
4.1 Retailers' Best Response
The retailers’ best response for the suppliers’ w and l are given in the following
lemma. The proof of this lemma as well as all the other proofs in this thesis is given
in the appendix B.
Lemma 1. The payoff function for each retailer is concave in its own strategy.
And there exists a unique Nash equilibrium between two retailers.
Due to the concavity of the payoff function and the uniqueness of equilibrium,
the retailers best pricing strategy is given by:
17
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
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∂
Π∂
=+−+−++−=
∂
Π∂
0)(4)(2)(2
0)(4)(2)(2
2211210
2
2
1212210
1
1
rr
R
rr
R
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m
mwwmll
m
θααθβλ
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Solving this, we can get that:
)7(                                              
)2(2
)()(2
                    21210*2
*
1
r
wwll
mm
θα
αβλ
+
+−+−
==
As a rational decision maker, we should have 0*2
*
1 ≥= mm , which means that
we should have [ )()(2 21210 wwll +−+− αβλ ]/ ≥+ )2(2 rθα 0, since every parameter
and decision variable should be positive, we need to have the following relationships
0 · 21 ww + · αβαλ /)(/2 210 ll +− and )(2 210 ll +≥ βλ .
4.2 Suppliers’ Decisions
Substituting *
i
m
in Eq. (7) back to Eq. (3) and (4), we can get the demand function
only in terms of w
i
and l
i
. For two suppliers, since each supplier must determine two
variables: the wholesales price w
i
and the promised lead-time li, we can make a
simple operation on these two equations to get the supplier’s wholesales price w
i
in
terms of li and
i
S
λ
(from now on, we call it
i
λ
for short) to simplify the calculation
procedures.
Add Eq.(3) to Eq.(4), we can get:
1
21210
12 )(2
)2)(()(2
k
ll
ww
r
r =
+
++
−
+
−=+
θαα
θαλλ
α
β
α
λ
Here, we need to have 021 ≥+ ww to ensure the decision makers are rational,
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which means we should have )](2/[)2)(()(2 21210 rrll θαθαλλβλ +++++≥ .
Subtract Eq.(4) from Eq.(3), we can get:
2
2121
12 )2(2
))(42()(
k
ll
ww
p
l =
+
−++−
=−
θα
θβλλ
From where we can get that 1 1 2( ) / 2w k k= − and 2 1 2( ) / 2w k k= + . Using
these two equations, we can express the suppliers’ problem in terms of
i
λ and l
i
.
1 1
2 2
1 2
1 1
1 2
2 2
: max ( , ( ))
2
         max ( , ( ))
2
s
s
k k
SOP c C l f t
k k
c C l f t
λ
λ
λ
λ
−⎛ ⎞
Π = − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
+⎛ ⎞Π = − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
We use a sequential solution procedure to solve this problem (similar to Liu et
al., 2007): for a given
i
λ
, we first obtain )(*
i
l λ
as a function of
i
λ
; we then
substitute )(*
i
l λ
into
i
S
Π and change the supplier’s decision problem to a single-
variable problem.
Lemma 2. For a given
i
λ , the supplier’s payoff function is concave in li.
Due to the concavity of supplier’s payoff function, the suppliers best PDL is
uniquely given by setting:
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Solving this, we can get the suppliers’ best l
i
as follows:
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The above two equations are similar to the optimal order quantity formula in the
standard newsvendor problem, with the demand distribution being replaced by the
RDL distribution. The term 2/)]2/()2(/[
pl
b θαθβαβ +++− is a reflection of
the cost structure and the market factors. Moreover, if the suppliers tardiness cost
2/)]2/()2(/[
pl
b θαθβαβ +++≤ , then it is optimal for the supplier to always
quote a zero lead-time regardless of the demand rate. In order to avoid this situation,
we assume that 2/)]2/()2(/[
pl
b θαθβαβ +++> to exclude this trivial solution.
4.3 The RDL Model
It is usually very difficult to derive the RDL distribution for a real supply chain. Even
though for some simple systems we can derive the exact RDL distributions, they
would be too complicated to be useful in our optimization. We assume that there
exists an inherent (uncapacitated or the RDL without any waiting) RDL Xi and
propose a model to modify this Xi so as to characterize the actual system RDL Yi.
Let φ and Φ denote the density function and distribution function of Xi
respectively. Assuming no workload influence, then, the supplier should quote
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We note that
−
i
l depends on the system cost structure, the marketing conditions
and the property of the inherent RDL, but is independent of the external demands, so
in a particular market, for a given system this parameter is a constant. We call l
i
the
system’s configuration lead-time.
4.3.1 The M/M/1 Model
Suppose that Xi is the exponential service time of a single-server queue with a service
rate
i
µ
. Assume that the demand process is Poisson with rate
i
λ
(where
ii
λµ ≥ ). Then,
naturally, Yi is the steady-state customer sojourn time in the M/M/1 queue. From
standard queuing results, we will have )]1/(1ln[)( 11
iiii
xx −=Φ −− µ and
)]1/(1ln[)()( 11
iiii
xxF
i
−−= −− λµ
λ
.
Combining these, we can get the configuration lead-time and best PDL become:
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Note that the configuration lead-time l
i
is decreasing in
i
µ and the optimal
lead-time decision *
i
l
is independent of other player’s strategy. This independence
enables us to reduce the dimension of the game, thus facilitate the proof of the
existence of a unique equilibrium. Further more, Eq. (10) has an interesting
interpretation: PDL can be treated as the product of the system configuration lead-
time and the average number of outstanding orders plus one. The configuration lead-
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time is the product of the expected service time µ/1 and the safety factor. This
interpretation has an intriguing implication: The configuration lead-time is associated
with a single outstanding order, i.e., it is the PDL we quote to an order when no other
order is on hand. This shows that the configuration lead-time is the key in
determining the PDL. Furthermore, we note that *
l
will never be smaller than
−
l
.
Under this M/M/1 queue assumption, the optimal PDL should be as follows:
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And from where we can further simplify our lead-time cost function as follows:
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We can see that, ),(
ii
lC Φ
−
which is the system’s configuration lead-time cost,
depends on the system cost structure, the marketing conditions and the supplier’s
capacity
i
µ
, but is independent in external demands or other players’ strategies, so
in a particular market, for a given system this parameter will be a constant.
In above analysis, we need )](2/[)2)(()(2 21210 rrll θαθαλλβλ +++++≥ to
make sure 021 ≥+ ww , and in this M/M/1 model, in order to ensure a positive
wholesale price for each supplier, we need to have the following relationship that
)()()](2/[)2)((/2 22221111210 λµµλµµθαβθαλλβλ −+−≥+++−
−−
ll
rr
.
4.3.2 The Stackelberg Equilibrium
Substituting the suppliers’ optimal PDL given by Eq.(10) and the new lead-time cost
function into the profit function given by Eq.(5), we can obtain a new profit function
with only one variable
i
λ
:
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Lemma 3. The payoff function for each supplier is concave in its own strategy.
And there exists a unique Nash equilibrium between two suppliers.
Due to the concavity of the payoff function and the uniqueness of equilibrium,
the suppliers best demand rate strategy *
i
λ
is the unique solution to :
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Once we get the optimal demand rate strategies *
i
λ
, we can get *
i
l
from Eq.
(10) and get *
i
w
from Eq. (8) and (9).
Further more, we can simplify Eq. (7) and (1), (2) as follows:
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Chapter 5
The Retailers Stackelberg Game
In this section, we consider the scenario that the four members of the supply chain
interact in a Stackelberg game with the retailers as the leaders and the suppliers as the
followers. In this Retailer Stackelberg (RS) game, each retailer chooses its margins
using the suppliers’ reaction functions and the other retailer’s margins . Each supplier
sets his wholesale price and PDL, conditional on these retailer margins and the
competing product’s wholesale price and PDL.
5.1 Suppliers' Best Response
To the suppliers, the solution step is similar to former section, the only difference is
that here the retailers margin m
i
is given , then suppliers’ wholesales price w
i
can be
expressed in terms of m
i
, l
i
and w
i
. Add Eq. (3) to Eq.(4), we can get:
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Here, we need to have 021 ≥+ ww to ensure the decision makers are rational,
which means we should have )(2/)(/)(/2 2121210 mmll +++−+≥ αλλαβαλ .
Subtract Eq.(4) from Eq.(3), we can get:
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Once more we can get that 1 3 4( ) / 2w k k= − and 2 3 4( ) / 2w k k= + and we can
express the suppliers’ problem in terms of
i
λ
and li.
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We use a similar sequential solution procedure to solve this problem as we have
shown in Section 4.2: for a given
i
λ
, we first obtain )(*
i
l λ
as a function of
i
λ
; we
then substitute )(*
i
l λ into
i
S
Π and change the supplier’s decision problem to a
single-variable problem.
Lemma 4. For a given
i
λ
, the supplier’s payoff function is concave in li.
Due to the concavity of supplier’s payoff function, the suppliers best demand
rate *
i
λ
is uniquely given by setting:
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Once we get the optimal demand rate strategies *
i
λ
, we can get *
i
l
from Eq.
(10) and get *
i
w
from Eq.(11) and (12).
5.2 Retailers’ Decisions
Since the supplier’s decision variable becomes only
i
λ
, so after we know the best
response actions of the suppliers, the demand rate for the retailers, which is obtained
by Eq. (1) and (2), can be simplified to only contain *
i
λ
and m
i
as follows:
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Lemma 5. The payoff function for each retailer is concave in its own strategy.
And there exists a unique Nash equilibrium between two retailers.
Due to the concavity of the payoff function and the uniqueness of equilibrium,
the retailer’s best strategy *
i
m
is the unique solution to:
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Lemma 5), we can derive that *2
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Chapter 6
The Vertical Nash Game
In this Vertical Nash(VN) game, both suppliers decide their wholesales price and
PDL, both retailers decide their margins at the same time conditioning on the
decisions of all other members are given to maximize individual combined profit
from both products. We can describe the players’ profits under this game as follows:
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From the perspective of retailers, they try to maximize their profits as w
i
and li
are given, the solution steps are quite similar as in section 4 when they are followers.
For the suppliers, from section 5, we can see that when they are followers, we can
always transform the two-dimension decision problem of w
i
and li into one dimension
of demand
i
λ
only. So the solution steps for suppliers are quite similar with that in
section 5 , we will not describe them again.
Lemma 6. The payoff function for each game player is concave in its own
strategy. And there exists a unique Nash equilibrium between these four supply chain
members.
Due to the concavity of the payoff function and the uniqueness of equilibrium,
the supplier’s best strategy *
i
λ
and the retailer’s best margin *
i
m
are the unique
solution to:
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Due to the transformation of the suppliers’ decision variables as in section 5,
the demand rate
i
R
λ
for retailers can also be simplified as follows:
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From above equations, we can obtain that:
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Chapter 7
Numerical Analysis and Discussion of Results
In this section, we examine the impact of various input parameters on the optimal
decisions, and discuss main managerial insights offered by our model. Due to the
complexity of our problem, no closed-form solutions to the equilibrium strategies
could be obtained, although they could be completely characterized. Therefore, in
order to gain more concrete understanding of our results and the underlying intuition,
we resort to extensive numerical experiments, whose results are reported below with
interpretations.
In what follows, we first perform a sensitivity analysis to look at how
equilibrium decisions are affected by various parameters in section 7.1. We then
proceed to highlight main managerial insights along with intuitive explanation in
section 7.2. To facilitate our study, throughout the following text, we limit our
attention to the symmetric case only, namely, the two suppliers are assumed to have
the same capacity (
µµµ == 21 ). This symmetry assumption is commonly made in
many papers involving competition (see McGuire and Staelin 1983, Ha and Tong
2008). As a result, the two suppliers’ configuration lead-times are equal, and their
configuration lead-time costs are equal as well. In other words, the asymmetry
assumption implies that
−−−
== lll 21 and
−−−
=Φ=Φ ClClC ),(),( 2211 .
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7.1 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we focus on how the equilibrium results such as the wholesale price,
PDL, retail price and profits change with model parameters. The following Table 1
summarizes some of the important results of our sensitivity analysis (explanations are
provided in the following several subsections).
7.1.1 Effect of Price Sensitivity Factor
α
In this part, we examine the influence of price sensitivity factor
α
. From previous
discussion (Eq. 10), we know that in order to keep the configuration lead-time greater
than 0, we should have )2(2/)2(2/
pl
hhb θαθβαβ ++++>+ . Under our given
value of parameters, we need >α 0.2115, so our numerical example is conducted
when ∈α [0.25,1.5] with step size of 0.05 (results are shown in Appendix C, Figure
2).
Understandably, the effect of
α
is more related to the relationship between
decision variables, but less related to the competition effect. That is, the effect of
α
in the absence of competition is essentially the same as that in the presence of
competition. Consequently, our interpretation below will place an emphasis in the
intrinsic relationship among all factors but competition, as if competition were not
existent, as it only plays a secondary role in driving the effect of
α
.
A smaller value ofα implies demand for a particular product is less effected by
its price change. Therefore, as
α
decreases, it is natural to see higher wholesale price
and retail price. Our results, as can be seen in Figure 2, agree with this convention.
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Table 1. Comparative Statics
Demand PDL
(
i
l )
Wholesale
Price
(
i
w )
Retailer
Margin
(
ij
m )
Retail
Price
Supplier
Profit
(
i
S
Π )
Retailer
Profit
(
j
R
Π )
Total
Profit
Price
Sensitivity
factor
α
↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
PDL sensitivity
factor
β
↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓
Product
Differentiation
p
θ
↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
Retailer
Differentiation
r
θ
↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
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The impact of
α
on PDL is more intricate. In the traditional monopolist model
without consideration of lead-time, demand is specified by 0 pλ λ α= − , and the
optimal price and demand are 0 / 2λ α and 0 / 2λ , respectively. Therefore, as α
decreases, the optimal price increases, whereas the optimal demand is kept constant.
This suggests that as the price sensitivity factor
α
decreases, it is more important to
increase the profit margin in order to maximize profit. Similar logic applies in our
problem when lead-time comes into the picture. In our model, the suppliers’ profit
margin is
w c C− − . Since gaining deeper profit margin is the direction to maximize
profit, the lead-time cost C should decrease at the optimum. Note that the lead-time
cost and the optimal lead-time quotation always move in the same direction (both are
/ ( )µ µ λ− times a constant, as can be seen from Eq. (10) and the immediately
following equations). Therefore, the optimal lead-time quotation decreases.
Now we turn to the optimal demand. As noted above, in the absence of lead-
time, the optimal demand is independent of price sensitivity factor
α
. In the
presence of lead-time, the demand is augmented by an additional term
lβ− . Since
we know from above the PDL increases in
α
, it follows that a decrease in
α
will
cause the optimal demand to increase.
A direct consequence of the increased demand and profit margin is that both the
suppliers and the retailers enjoy higher profits as α decreases, which is
straightforward.
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7.1.2 Effect of Lead-Time Sensitivity Factor β
In this part, we examine the influence of lead-time sensitivity factor β on the
performance of the supply chain.
Figure 3 (in Appendix 3) illustrate the results and indicates that as β increases,
both the suppliers and the retailers are worse off, which is easy to understand because
more demanding consumers never benefit any firm. Less obvious are the changes of
the optimal decisions and the induced demand, which we now explain as follows. By
definition, a larger value of β implies demand for a particular product is more
effected by a lead-time change. Therefore, as β increases, which means the customers
are more sensitive to lead-time, the suppliers have to quote a shorter PDL, which in
turn stimulates more demand. Since the capacity of suppliers does not change, in
order to avoid overloading the system, the suppliers have to raise their wholesale
prices and this in turn leads to an decrease of demand rate. The perplexing question is
how the equilibrium demand compares to that before the change of
β
. Our results
show the answer is that it is lower than before, because quoting a shorter PDL only
makes sense when the random lead-time becomes stochastically smaller. By queuing
analogy, given the same service rate, the only way to achieve a stochastically smaller
lead-time is to reduce the average arrival rate. Hence the lower equilibrium demand
rate.
7.1.3 Effects of Price and Retail Store Competition Intensities
p
θ
and
r
θ
As a measure of price competition intensity, the parameter
p
θ indicates the sensitivity
of customers to price difference between two products. Put it in another way, it can
34
be considered as the degree of product differentiation or substitutability – the more
differentiated the two products, the lower the price competition, and vice versa. The
effect of
p
θ
is illustrated in Figure 4 (Appendix 3) and is explained as follows.
As the two products become more differentiated, i.e., as
p
θ increases, suppliers
will naturally raise the wholesale price due to the waning price competition pressure.
On the other hand, the retailers’ best reaction is to absorb a portion of the wholesale
price increase and pass the rest to consumers. Consequently, their retail margins
decrease while the retail prices increase.
As a result of the higher retail price, the induced demand will decrease, which in
turn results in a stochastically smaller lead-time. Therefore the PDL tends to
decreases. The feedback effect of the PDL on demand implies that the shorter PDL
will then recover demand to certain extent. Nonetheless, the equilibrium demand will
be definitely smaller.
As for the effect of
p
θ
on different parties’ profits, obviously the suppliers will
be better off, because they have more monopolistic power as
p
θ
decreases. The
retailers, however, will suffer because both their profit margin and the demand
decrease. To summarize, lower price competition (alternatively, higher product
differentiation) benefits the suppliers at the expense of the retailers.
The effect of
r
θ is shown in Figure 5, and can be explained in a similar fashion.
To elaborate, a decreasing
r
θ
implies higher degree of retail stores differentiation.
Facing less competition pressure, the retailers will demand a higher profit margin.
The rational response of the suppliers is to absorb part of the shock to reduce the
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negative impact on their demand by decreasing wholesale price, and pass the rest to
consumers, leading to an increase in retail price.
The inflated retail price in turn shrinks the demand, making it sensible to quote a
shorter PDL. As for the profits, the retailers benefit from more monopolistic power,
whereas the suppliers suffer due to their falling wholesale price and demand.
We remark that the above findings are consistent with Choi (1996), which not
only validates our results (our model reduces to Choi’s if all lead-time related
parameters are set to 0, i.e., 0
l
b h β θ= = = = ), but also implies that the presence of
lead-time and the competition centering around it do not change the effect of product
or store differentiation qualitatively.
7.2 Discussion of Managerial Insights
In this subsection, we discuss our main managerial insights and explain the
underlying intuition. In particular, we first investigate the implication of channel
leadership, then study the role of channel structure, finally examine some
counterintuitive findings pertaining to the presence of lead-time and its competition.
7.2.1 Effect of Different Channel Leaderships
Figure 6 presents the equilibrium results in the three leadership structures as the
capacity of supplier changes. Under the vertical strategic substitute-type demand
functions, previous studies have shown that retail prices are generally higher when
there is a channel leadership by either a supplier (Jeuland and Shugan, 1988) or a
retailer (Choi, 1991). Our study reveals similar results:
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This implies a channel leadership of either form is not socially desirable as
consumers are worse off (i.e., pay more and buy less).
The impact of channel leadership on equilibrium profits for both suppliers and
retailers is reflected in the following inequalities:
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R
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R
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R
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S
VN
S
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S
Π>Π>Π
Π>Π>Π
which implies that a channel member always prefers Stackelberg leadership, because
of the first mover advantage.
Finally, we compare total channel profits of the three leadership structures.
Similar to Choi (1996), we find the total channel profit is the largest in the VN game
where there is no channel leadership, which implies that in either Stackelberg game,
by moving away from the Nash game, the leaders can increase their profits but the
followers’ loss outweighs the leaders’ gain.
It is worth noting that all the above results are reminiscent of existing findings
reported in the literature when lead-time is not taken into account. This means that
the consideration of lead-time does not change the effect of channel leadership
qualitatively.
7.2.2 Effect of Different Channel Structures
If one supplier and one retailer are removed from our duopoly common retailers
market structure, then our model boils down to the one studied by Liu et al. (2007).
We now draw a comparison with the Liu et al. (2007) to examine the effect of
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different channel structures. For fair comparison, we set the potential market for the
single product in Liu et al. (2007) to be twice as large as that in our model (i.e., 0λ
= 20), and the other parameters are the same in both models.
Figure 7 shows the effect of the suppliers’ capacity µ on equilibrium results of
Liu et al. (2007) model. It indicates similar effect of channel leadership on
equilibrium profits: channel leadership is still preferred, and the VN games still
yields the best system performance. As the main difference between Liu et al. (2007)
and our work is the horizontal competition between counterparts at the same supply
chain level, the above observation means that the horizontal competition does not
alter the nature of the channel leadership effect.
A closer look at Figures 6 and 7 exhibits that the presence of horizontal
competition brings down the price and profits noticeably, as the monopolistic power
of both suppliers and retailers is significantly weakened.
7.2.3 Effect of Suppliers' Capacity µ
The distinctive feature of our model is to endogenize the lead-time decision, which is
inherently driven by the suppliers’ capacity. We now look at the impact of capacity
on the optimal decision making process.
If we look at the extreme case where capacity is infinite, then our problem
reduces to the Choi (1996) model, in which lead-time is not a concern at all (i.e.,
everything is made instantaneously so lead-time is 0, and of course there is no lead-
time competition). Figure 6 confirms the above claim, as we can see that when µ
increases, all curves in the figure become flat and converge to the Choi (1996) results.
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We next look at how capacity µ affects the equilibrium results. As capacity
increases, the supplier demand increases, while PDL decreases. This is intuitive
because the production time and waiting time decrease with higher capacity, and this
in turn leads to a shorter PDL and higher demand. It is a little surprising that the
supplier’s wholesale price w decreases as
µ
increases. From previous discussion in
section 4.2, we know that the wholesale price w is a function of the demand and PDL
and it increases as the PDL and demand decrease. While the decrease in the PDL is
smaller than the increase in the demand as capacity µ increases, which leads to the
decrease of the wholesale price w.
As µ increases, the retail price for the customers decreases, suggesting that
customers benefit from an increase in supplier capacity. The profits of both retailers
and entire system also increase as
µ
increases. This makes sense since as
µ
increases,
the PDL decreases and hence the demand increases. In addition, an increase in retail
price and a decrease in wholesale price result in an increase in the margins for both
products, which together lead to the increase of retailers’ profits. Due to the increase
of both supplier and retailer profit, the profit for the entire system also increases.
7.2.4 Effect of Lead-Time Competition Intensity
l
θ
The lead-time competition intensity
l
θ
in effect measures the competition pressure the
suppliers face. Using the logic behind the effect of
p
θ
and
r
θ
, one would expect a
larger
l
θ to hurt the suppliers while benefiting retailers. Surprisingly, our results show
the opposite (Figure 8).
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To understand the driver of this counterintuitive result, note that as
l
θ
increases, PDL will naturally decrease. On the other hand, wholesale price will
increase, because the suppliers now focus on the more intense lead-time competition
and leverage less on price competition. As a result, demand will fall. To reduce the
negative impact of price on demand, the retailers’ rational response is to absorb some
of the price increase by demanding a lower margin, and pass the rest to customers.
As both the margin and demand for the retailers go down, their profits decrease
accordingly. As for the suppliers, their increase in profit margin more than
compensate the decrease in demand, therefore they turn out to be better off.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Research
This thesis extends the growing literature of pricing and lead-time studies by
analyzing competitive pricing and PDL strategies of duopoly suppliers who produce
differentiated but substitutable products and duopoly retailers who sell both products.
A major contribution of this thesis is to incorporate the inter-supply chain
competition in the decision model. Independent players make decisions about prices
and the PDL, knowing that their decisions will affect the decision of their rival and
the demand rate, which in turn will affect their final profits. Fluctuations in the RDL
affect the delivery time service performance, hence the PDL decision is intimately
related to the pricing decision; together they affect the profitability of the firms and
the whole supply chain system. Formulating the decentralized decision problem
under three different games, we have obtained the unique equilibrium analytically
and provided exact formulas to compute the optimal prices and PDL for suppliers
and retailers.
Some results here are very similar to those of previous studies which consider
pricing decisions only in a common retailer channel structure ( see Choi, 1996), such
as price differentiation helps suppliers while hurting retailers, whereas retailer
differentiation helps retailers while hurting suppliers. When using multiple common
retailers, therefore, suppliers are better off by recruiting homogeneous retailers. On
the other hand, common retailers are better off by selling a relatively less
differentiated set of products.
41
Some results provide really fresh new insights and may need further
investigation. In common sense, the profits of channel leaders’ are always higher
than those of the followers’ or the Nash players, but we find that when suppliers’
capacities are high enough, retailers’ profits will be highest in the VN game, which
counters intuition that they should be able to earn more if they act as Stackelberg-
leaders. We think this is mainly because the PDL variable, higher capacity makes the
suppliers can charge a much shorter PDL, which makes the suppliers more powerful
in making decisions since they can switch between wholesale price and PDL to avoid
disadvantage. This hurts the retailers no matter when they are leaders or followers,
but when the suppliers and retailers need to make their decisions at the same time,
namely, in the VN game, the retailers can suffer the smallest disadvantages incurred
by introducing the PDL decision variable to the suppliers. This shows that as retailers,
before struggling for the channel leaders, they should first find out their suppliers’
real capacity levels, if suppliers’ capacities are low, they will be most beneficial by
becoming the channel leaders, otherwise, it will be better for them to just catch up
with the suppliers’ powers.
From our analysis in the last part of section 7, we can see that the monopoly
supplier and monopoly retailer channel is worst for customers, since it results in
highest retail price and lowest demand. If the suppliers want to lower down the retail
price to attract more demand, they will choose to introduce more homogeneous
retailers while the retailers will want to carry more relatively homogeneous products.
There will be a conflict between them. Similar conflict exists other aspects, such as
the suppliers will always struggle for channel leadership to earn highest profit while
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the retailers will always try to catch up with the suppliers or even become the
Stackelberg leaders to protect their own profits.
As a potential future research direction, one can compare the results of the linear
demand model with a constant elasticity model to see how the decisions and the
performance of the supply chain change. Another extension could be considering
asymmetric conditions. In our model, retailers are assumed to set same margins for
both products they sell and the cost for two suppliers are completely identical. It is
left for future research to allow for asymmetric demand functions and strategies.
Furthermore, we assume that the cost parameters and demand rate are common
knowledge. In practice, they are often private information, unknown to other parties.
We must then make decisions under asymmetric information and may need to design
a scheme to induce a supply chain partner to reveal his or her private information.
Further research is also needed to investigate these issues. Finally, competition under
dynamic price and lead-time quotations would also be of interest for future work.
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Appendix A. Discussion of Assumptions
Discussion of Assumption 1
If we consider the influence between product i sold by retailer j and product j sold by
retailer i(denoted by 2rθ , and the former rθ is replaced by 1rθ ), the demand
function will become as follows:
11 0 11 1 21 11 2 1 1 12 11 2 22 11
12 0 12 1 22 12 2 1 1 11 12 2 21 12
21 0 21 2 11 21 1 2 1 22 21 2 12 21
22 0 22
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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p l r r
p l p p l l p p p p
p l p p l l p p p p
p l p p l l p p p p
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λ λ α β θ θ θ θ
λ λ α
= − − + − + − + − + −
= − − + − + − + − + −
= − − + − + − + − + −
= − 2 12 22 1 2 1 21 22 2 11 22( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p l r rl p p l l p p p pβ θ θ θ θ− + − + − + − + −
and the demand rate for each supplier and each retailer will become :
1
2
1
2
0 11 21 1 2 1 2 22 12 11 21
0 12 22 1 2 1 2 11 21 12 22
0 11 12 1 2 1 2 21 22 11 12
0 11 12 2 1
2 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 ( ) 2 2 ( ) ( )( )
2 ( ) 2 2 (
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R r r
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S l
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= − + − + + + + − −
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= − + − + − 2 2 11 12 21 22) ( )( )p r p p p pθ θ+ + + − −
From where we can see that ifr we add one more parameter 2rθ (swithover of
demand toward price differenciation of different product sold in different store), the
demand function do not change a lot, for retailers' demand rate, the only change is
former
r
θ
becomes 1 2r rθ θ+ , for two suppliers, former pθ becomes 2p rθ θ+ , so it
would not change the finally results we obtained.
Discussion of Assumption 2
Here we will take Supplier Stackelberg game as an example to illustrate that the
equilibrium retail margins for two products are the same.
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Assume that
ij
m
is the margin retailer i determines toward product j, and the
demand function can be rewrite as follows:
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So we have:
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(1) Retailers' best response
The profit function for each retailer should be:
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Take retail 1 as an example
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From where we can see that the expected profit function is jointly concave
in 11m and 21m , and for retailer 2, the expected function is also jointly concave in 12m
and 22m ; then the optimal solutions can be obtained by setting the first order
conditions equal to 0:
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From where we can get the conclusion that we have
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And
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(2)Suppliers' decision
For suppliers, from Eq. (15)+(16), we have:
1 20
1 2 11 21 1 2
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+
+ = − + − + −
Substituting 11 21m m+ into this equation and we will find the result is just the
same as in part 4.2, so does the following calculation steps and the final equilibrium
results. So if the retailer charge different margins for different product, the initial
calculation steps may change, but it would not affect the final equilibrium results,
which means the retails will always charge same margin for both products.
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Appendix B. Mathematical Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
(1) The concavity of retailer’s payoff function and the existence of Nash equilibrium
between two retailers.
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The payoff function is continuous and concave in each retailer’s own strategy.
Then, there exists at least one pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the game.
(2) The uniqueness of this equilibrium. We use index theory approach. In order
to prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium, we need to show that:
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So:
2
2
1
*
2
2
*
1
)(16
4
r
r
m
m
m
m
θα
θ
+
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
This equation is obviously <
 
1, so we know that there is a unique equilibrium. 
Proof of Lemma 2
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
<+−=
∂
Π∂
<+−=
∂
Π∂
0)()(
0)()(
222
2
2
112
1
2
2
2
1
1
lfhb
l
lfhb
l
S
S
λ
λ
λ
λ
So we get the conclusion that for any give
i
λ
, the suppliers’ payoff functions are
concave in li.  
Proof of Lemma 3
(1) The concavity of supplier’s payoff function and the existence of a Nash
Equilibrium between two suppliers.
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The payoff function is continuous and concave in each supplier’s own strategy.
Then, there exists at least one pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the game.
(2) Uniqueness of equilibrium. We still use index theory approach. In order to
prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium, we need to show that:
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Furthermore, we can know 22 /
iS
i
λ∂Π∂ from the first part of this proof. It is
straightforward that:
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So we can get our conclusion that there is a unique equilibrium.  
Proof of Lemma 4. The proof of Lemma 4 is the same as that of Lemma 2.  
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Proof of Lemma 5
(1)The concavity of two suppliers’ payoff functions and the existence of a Nash
Equilibrium between them.
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The payoff function is continuous and concave in each supplier’s own strategy.
Then, there exists at least one pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the game.
(2) Uniqueness of equilibrium (index theory approach), the steps are quite
similar with that in the proof of Lemma 3. Since we have:
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Furthermore, we can know 22 /
iS
i
λ∂Π∂ from the first part of this proof. It is
straightforward that:
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So we can get our conclusion that there is a unique equilibrium.  
Proof of Lemma 6
(1) The concavity of two retailers’ payoff functions and the existence of a Nash
Equilibrium between them.
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consider *
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as a function of m
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. Using the implicit function theorem, we can get:
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Since we have:
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We can get the conclusion that 0/ 1
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1 <∂∂ mλ and it is independent of
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the same method, we can see that 1
*
2 / m∂∂λ , 2
*
1 / m∂∂λ and 2
*
2 / m∂∂λ are also smaller
than 0 and are independent of . So we can get that:
0
2
2
*
1
2
2
2
*
1
2
2
1
*
2
2
2
1
*
1
2
=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
mmmm
λλλλ
And now we can get the conclusion that:
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The payoff function is continuous and concave in each retailer’s own strategy.
Then, there exists at least one pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the game.
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(2) Uniqueness of equilibrium (Index theory approach). Since we have:
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So we can get our conclusion that there is a unique equilibrium.  
Proof of Lemma 7
(1) The concavity of four players payoff functions and the existence of a Nash
Equilibrium between them. From the proof of Lemma 1 and 4, we know that:
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The payoff function is continuous and concave in each player’s own strategy.
Then, there exists at least one pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the game.
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(2) Uniqueness of equilibrium (Index theory approach).
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Let det(H) denote the determinant of matrix H and Mi j denote the minor of a
determinant of matrix H, which is obtained by deleting the i-th row and j-th column
from matrix H. According to the expansion theorem of a determinant, we can get that:
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Using the same theorem, we can get )det( 11M , )det( 21M , )det( 31M and )det( 41M ,
then we can simplify the determinant of matrix H as follows:
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Under Vertical Nash game, we have:
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So we can conclude that det(H) >0, and this make sure the uniqueness of a
equilibrium.  
59
Appendix C. Figures for Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 2: Influence of price sensitivity factor α when 20=µ ( 0λ = 10,b =3,h =
0.3, β = 0.8,
p
θ = 0.3,
l
θ = 0.5,
r
θ = 0.4,c = 1.5 and ∈α [0,1.3] with step size of
0.05)
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Figure 3: Influence of lead-time sensitivity factor β when 20=µ ( 0λ = 10,b =3,h
= 0.3,α = 0.6,
p
θ = 0.3,
l
θ = 0.5,
r
θ = 0.4,c = 1.5 and ∈β [0,1.3] with step size of
0.05)
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Figure 4: Influence of price competition intensity
p
θ
when 20=µ ( 0λ = 10,b =3,h
= 0.3, 6.0=α , β = 0.8,
l
θ = 0.5,
r
θ = 0.4,c = 1.5 and ∈
p
θ [0,1.3] with step size of
0.05)
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Figure 5: Influence of retail store competition intensity
r
θ
when 20=µ ( 0λ = 10,b
=3,h = 0.3, 6.0=α , β = 0.8,
p
θ
= 0.3,
l
θ
= 0.5,c = 1.5 and ∈
r
θ
[0,1.3] with step
size of 0.05)
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Figure 6: Influence of supplier's capacity µ on the performance of the supply chain
( 0λ = 10,b =3,h = 0.3,α = 0.6, β = 0.8,
p
θ = 0.3,
l
θ = 0.5,
r
θ = 0.4,c = 1.5
and ]30,5[∈µ with step size of 1)
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Figure 7: Influence of supplier's capacity
µ
on the performance of monopoly supplier
and retailer channel structure ( 0λ = 20,b =3,h = 0.3,α = 0.6, β = 0.8,c = 1.5and
]30,5[∈µ with step size of 1)
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Figure 8: Influence of lead-time competition intensity
l
θ
when 20=µ ( 0λ = 10,b
=3,h = 0.3, 6.0=α , β = 0.8,
p
θ = 0.3,
r
θ = 0.4,c = 1.5 and ∈
l
θ [0,1.3] with step
size of 0.05)
